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COURT LOG -IN CHAMBERS 
OCTOBER 28 2010 4:32 PM 
COURT REPORTER: ANNE MACMANUS 
PA ART VERHAREN 
BARRY:MCHUGH 
DA CHRISTOPHER SCHWARTZ 
JED WHITAKER 
J We're in session in chambers. Christopher Schwartz requested a limited inquiry 
of a juror. 
Christopher Schwartz 1'd first like to question juror Hyslop. 
Barry McHugh 
the jury 
F or the record, questioning of the jurors invades the province of 
J This concern is unique and the issue raised is based on information received 
during deliberation. It is in the interest of justice to allow a limited inquiry. 
Art VerHaren Will the court do the inquiry? 
J Counsel will - actually it may be a combinati()n. 
Juror Hyslop enters·the courts chambers 
J Explains to juror Hyslop the presiding jurors question to the court. 
Hyslop They were making a big deal about the swastika and Born 2 kill on the side of the 
truck. I told them of my buddies and I writing it on a truck. She asked if I was a racist. 
I'm not but to a point I guess I am. It didn't effect me being fair. I had no response to 
issues asked in questioning. 
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There was "kinda-Iguess so" attempt by them - our first vote I said not guilty and they all 
got after me - I got tired of it after about one hour of that and I said guilty. I don't know 
if I feel good about my decision. 
J You're not to give into intimidation - didthat occur? 
Hyslop Nope 
XE by Christopher Schwartz I don't remember exactly what she said. She said "that's 
not funny and we've got to tell the judge now". She wrote a paper. I kind of felt 
pressure after the not guilty vote. The jury talked about my beliefs. They didn't like my 
opinion. They said I shouldn't be racist. I felt pressured. Then they went over the rules 
with me. I felt they're guilty based on the law but not in my opinion. A little of what 
changed my mind is what they said to me about my beliefs. 
J You're not in trouble there's no wrong answer. 
XE BY Jed Whitaker I read the instruction - in my personal opinion they are not guilty. 
I read the rules over again and we discussedt. 
XE by Barry McHughI told a lady by myself - no with anyone else there - about my 
buddies and I putting swastika on the truck at mud bogging. This was with the lady who 
wrote the question out. Then she asked if! was a racist and wrote a note to the judge. 
The vote was before that. We read the instructions and discussed. I participated 30 
minutes and in the rules I came to the conclusion they're guilty. 
J questions Hyslop I have no questions for the court. They had me read the questions 
a little closer. I can't remember which one. 
J Juror excused. 
J We made a record - you can file motions if you feel it appropriate. The reporter 
is directed to provide counsel with a transcript of the questioning of juror Hyslop. We'll 
return to the courtroom. 
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COURT LOG - IN CHAMBERS 
OCTOBER 25, 2010 9:00 AM 
COURT REPORTER: ANNE MACMANUS 
P A ART VERHAREN 
BARRY MCHUGH 
DA CHRISTOPHER SCHWARTZ 
JED WHITAKER 
J We are in session in chambers with counsel- defendants are not present. 
Christopher Schwartz Waive appearance of my client in chambers. 
Jed Whitaker Waive appearance of my client in chambers. 
J We're here to determine how many preemptory challenges are to be made. Are 
there any motions? 
Art VerHaren I move to dismiss the habitual offender portion re: Frank Tankovich. 
Jed Whitaker I have no objection. 
J Each side shall have 6 preemptory and 2 per side for 2 extra jurors. There is a 
conflict between the defendants. I'll extend 2 additional challenges for a total of 18 
challenges - we'll have 14 jurors - we'll call 32 jurors. 
I've gone through the jury list with counsel and it appears there are persons with 
felony convictions. We have agreed that there are some jurors who should be excused -
Marion Daniels works for P A, Lindsey Holbert is a client of Christopher Schwartz , 
Carmel Thomas works in Jed Whitaker's office and Joey Dixon and Robert Strate are 
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excused - all per agreement. It appears that jurors 11, 14, 18, 26, 38, 54, 55, 58 and 59 
have felony convictions and an inquiry may need to be made. 
J We have pending motions to dismiss - Count II conspiracy to commit malicious 
harassment and a motion in limine to preclude the overt acts of Ira Tankovich. Explains 
rulings - both motions denied. 
Jed Whitaker I'd like to make sure that all the exhibits come in against both defendants 
- for appeal purposes. 
J I'm not sure what evidence will come in but we'll make sure we do that. Recess 
to the courtroom, 
INSERT FOR JURY CHALLENGE SESSION - IN CHAMBERS 
J We are present in chambers - by agreement both defendants are not in chambers. 
We'll questions 2 jurors. 
JUROR REYNOLDS - I had a 2003 felony possession of meth conviction. I did a rider 
and then out on probation. I had a probation violation and served 1 Yz years in prison. I 
have now been fully discharged from parole. I served my prison time at NICI - "tIle 
Farm". 
J Thanks juror - exit to courtroom 
JUROR SEGO - I had a withheld judgment many hears ago. I was successfully 
discharged from probation. 
XE by Jed Whitaker - I don't lmow if the withheld judgment was dismissed." 
J Thanks juror - exit to courtroom. 
Art VerHaren - I believe juror Sego is OK however the other is not 
J Recess 
J In session 
Christopher Schwartz - I believe both are fine as they have been both discharged from 
probation. 
Art VerHaren -let's bring Sego back and question re: perjury charge. 
J Return juror Sego to chambers. Juror present. We have pulled the 2000 charge 
and it is a perjury charge; 
630 
JUROR SEGO - that was part of my divorce. I didn't fill out a form correctly-
J We just want to get the facts straight 
JUROR SEGO I had a withheld and a probation violation - ultimately I was discharged 
form probation in 2003. My memory has been refreshed. 
XE by Art VerHaren This was not in connection with a child endangerment charge- they 
were two separate issues. The endangerment came first and I was on probation for that. 
Theperjury·was for a financial statement for public defender in the endangerment charge. 
For the probation violation I got local jail. 
XE Christopher Schwartz I have voted with no problems. I'm doing well now. I sat 
on ajury a couple of years ago. 
J Juror Sego excused to courtroom 
Art VerHaren - I don't believe the statute has been complied with - both didn't 
satisfactorily complete probation. 
Jed Whitaker Both qualify 
SW They either both are or are not OK 
J I won't disqualify either juror. 
SW For the record I want to make an objection to the discharge of juror Ledbetter. I 
didn't have a chance to question her regarding the response to questioning. 
Jed Whitaker Ijoin in the objection 
J Re: Ledbetter - I might impact both sides and I not the objections for the record. 
Recess. 
J We're again in session for challenges - explains the procedure for counsel. Off 
record. 
J Back in the record - the jury is seated as follows:# 1 Andreasson # 15 Crook #22 
Foster #34 Jones #2 Arhutick #33 Hyslop #35 Givens #66 Starr #7 Billick #9 
Boni #46 Michael #65 Standal #72 Widener #64 Stamsos. 
COUNSEL AGREE WITH JURY AS SEATED. 
J Return to the courtroom 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE (I)UNTY OF KOOTE~!6TEOFIDAH 
, CQUNT'IlA"rfNtClnTt:,MAh 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
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We, the Jury, duly empaneled and sworn to tl) the above entitled action, for our 
verdict, 
say that we find the defendant: 
COUNT I 
(CHOOSE ONE ONLY) 
~GUILTY of Malicious Harassment 
JI!iI (I')\'SW.kt, po 
~UIL TY of DIsturbing the Peace 
NOT GUILTY . 
COUNT Il 
(CHOOSE ONE ONLY) 
UaUILTY of Conspiracy to Commit Malicious H;lrassment 
_ GUILTY of Conspiracy to Commit Dis1urbing the: Deaee 
NOT GUILTY. 





IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT t 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) J9~?:-:c:'LI . 
/ Plaintiff,) Case No. CRF (_ C2S0..J '7 ~ 
vsp . /1~ L j ) 
I tCl Lt __ 7C171!0\1 , ~ ~:g~~~~5~~~~~~~~~) 
~ Defendant. ) 
/032 N~3~ ) 
CPA- 1'0 ~r{ ~ ) 
Phone fa;, =-- ?=~O ) 






a te of this order ou must h sicall 
report to Probation & Parole. 202 Anton, Coeur d'Alene, Idaho (208/769-1444) and comply with conditions of 
the presentence investigation. The presentence report is due seven (7) days prior to the sentencing hearing. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that your continued release is conditioned upon your making and keeping all 
appointments with Probation & Parole, complying with all conditions of the presentence investigator, and 
obtaining any or all of the following evaluations. You must obtain any evaluation checked below. 
Substance Abuse Evaluation ......... [ ]} Pursuant to I. C. 19-2524, to be paid for by 
___ Mental Health Evaluation ............... ['] the Dept. of Health & Welfare subject to 
___ Psychosexual Evaluation reimbursement by the defendant. 
___ Domestic Violence Evaluatio /' i .:; (j .:;;" ( U 
YOU ARE ORDEREr;> to ap.12epr/r'sentencing on / . (" V f-) , 2r1 __ at :J '7 m. 
DATED this QDdaYOf O'--'+Q e-:-r~!S~, _~~~U_~...;..-1 __ -:::_=_J ______ _ 
Judge 
,C,2 g:~ CER-r(FI~~F DELIVERY, ) 
I hereby certify that on th' I day of Q c / , 20_) '-A_ copies of the foregoing Order 
were delivered in court9 ai ed ~stqge prepaid, sent ,facsimileor interoffice mail to: 
Defense Attorney: tL . v f! /,;..~ Court i' Interoffice II Faxed ----l~--
Defendant cit ~n Court Interoffice [j Mailed - addr ss above, . . c0 
Probation & Parole: . I~ , ';:?/ II In;ourt ,-, Iqteroffice raxed (208) ,69-1481 YJ / 
Prosecuting Attorney: W ZJ( t: l [~court I Interoffice f Faxed (20 /446-1833 
Health and Welfare 1':.1 Mailed Ii litero!!!ce U Faxed (2 8) 769-1430 
Other:-~}-~A-Court IJ /nteroffii;e I' Maile rI Faxed ____ _ 
~ I \ '1 
CLERK DI~DISZR:~~DURT / .y--/ 6 3 3 
\ ". \ ( / . 
Y:'L 'I \ ' 
11/10/2010 WED 16:26 FAX 4 KC PUBLIC DEFENDER ~~~ Dist. -file docs 
Jedediah J. Whitaker, Deputy Public Defenoer 
The Law Office of the Kootenai County Public Defender 
PO Box 9000 
'" Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
2010 NOV 10 PM4:47 
r"/j\yU\ Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701 Vv Bar Number: 6084 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 















CASE NUMBER CR-09-0022S.48 
Fel 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
COMES NOW, the above named defendant, by and through his attorney, ledediah 1 
Whitaker, Deputy Public Defender, and pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 34, moves this 
honorable Court for an Order vacating the verdict entered on October 28,2010, and an Order 
requiring a new trial in this matter. Tliis request is based upon the following violations of the 
14!001/003 
Defendant's rights as guaranteed by the constitution of the State ofIdaho and the United States of 
America; 
1. Impr<?~er conduc~ by the presiding ju,ror during ,de!,iberations. 
During deliberations ,the presiding juror halted the proceedings due to an 
opinion expressed by anoih~r juror: This action completely exceeds the authority 
granted a presiding juror .. It was designed to intimidate other Jurors and taint the 
I . 
MOTION FORNEW TRIAL 
Page 1 
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11/10/2010 WED 16: 26 FAX 44 KC PUBLIC DEFENDER ~~~ Dist. file docs I4J 002/003 
deliberatiDn prDcess. ThiSEp"gum~m.tis further suppDrted by the presidingjurDr's 
actions during the imprDperly halted deliberations. During the periDd the 
presiding juror interrupted anDther juror and then attempted to influence that juror 
thr~ugh the use Df guilt, recrimination, harassment, and the false display Df 
, 
authDrity. Clearly the presiding juror ignored the CDUrt's instructiDns and rather 
than acting as an impartial judge, behaved as a partisan advocate and basically a 
bully. These actio.ns by the presiding juror tainted the deliberatio.n pro.cess and 
vio.lated the Defendant's right to. a fair trial. 
2. Invalid verdict. 
The instruction~,~~,v~ I;>y .t~e .CDurt clearly infDrmed the jury that their 
verdict could nDt be reached. by corp.premise. HDwever, the post-verdict in 
chambers discussiDn with one juror makes it clear that the unanimDus verdict was . ,.. .. . 
theJesult ef a cDmpremise reached as a result efthe presidingjuro.r's cenduct. l 
The juror interviewed clearly state9 thnt the Defendant wns net guilty in their 
opinio.n but they had changed their verdict follo.wing the pressure and intimidatio.n 
applied by the presidingjuro.r. Therefo.re, the verdict entered in this case is 
invalid and vielates the Defendant's co.nstitutio.nal rights. 
1 The Court has previously ordered a rranscript of this interView. Once completed this transcript shall be included as 
an exhibit. 
MOTION FOR NSW TRIAL 
Page 2 
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11/10/2010 WED 16:27 FAX 446 KC PUBLIC DEFENDER ~~~ Dist. -file docs 141 003/003 
Counsel for the Defendant requests that a hearing be set in which the Defendant may calJ 
witnesses and present evidence. The requested time for this hearing is one hour. 
DATED this 'O~ daypfNovember, 20] O. 
OFFICE OF THE KOOTENAI 
COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
BY:~~F JEDIAH J WHITAKE 
DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certifY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was personally served by placing a 
copy of the same in the interoffice mailbox on th~ I t!. day of November. 2010, addressed 
to:':;~: .. ,' 
Kootenai County Prosecutor 
! i 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
Page 3 
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INSTRUCTION NO. _,_ 
Now that you have been sworn as jurors to try this case, I want to go over with you 
what will be happening. I will describe how the trial will be conducted and what we will be 
doing. At the end of the trial, I will give you more detailed guidance on how you are to 
reach your decision. 
Because the state has the burden of proof, it goes first. After the state's opening 
statement, the defense may make an opening statement, or may wait until the state has 
presented its case. 
The state will offer evidence that it says will support the charge( s) against the 
defendant. The defense may then present evidence, but is not required to do so. If the 
defense does present evidence, the state may then present rebuttal evidence. This is 
evidence offered to answer the defense's evidence. 
After you have heard all the evidence, I will give you additional instructions on the 
law. After you have heard the instructions, the state and the defense will each be given 
time for closing arguments. In their closing arguments, they will summarize the evidence to 
help you understand how it relates to the law. Just as the opening statements are not 
evidence, neither are the closing arguments. After the closing arguments, you will leave 
the courtroom together to make your decision. During your deliberations, you will have with 




Your duties are to determine the facts, to apply the law set forth in my instructions to 
those facts, and in this way to decide the case. In so doing, you must follow my 
instructions regardless of your own opinion of what the law is or should be, or what either 
side may state the law to be. You must consider them as a whole, not picking out one and 
disregarding others. The order in which the instructions are given has no significance as to 
their relative importance. The law requires that your decision be made solely upon the 
evidence before you. Neither sympathy nor prejudice should influence you in your 
deliberations. Faithful performance by you of these duties is vital to the administration of 
justice. 
In determining the facts, you may consider only the evidence admitted in this trial. 
This evidence consists of the testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits offered and received, 
and any stipulated or admitted facts. The production of evidence in court is governed by 
rules of law. At times during the trial, an objection may be made to a question asked a 
witness, or to a witness' answer, or to an exhibit. This simply means that I am being asked 
to decide a particular rule of law. Arguments on the admissibility of evidence are designed 
to aid the Court and are not to be considered by you nor affect your deliberations. If I 
sustain an objection to a question or to an exhibit, the witness may not answer the question 
or the exhibit may not be considered. Do not attempt to guess what the answer might have 
been or what the exhibit might have shown. Similarly, if I tell you not to consider a 
particular statement or exhibit you should put it out of your mind, and not refer to it or rely 
on it in your later deliberations. 
During the trial I may have to talk with the parties about the rules of law which 
should apply in this case. Sometimes we will talk here at the bench. At other times I will 
excuse you from the courtroom so that you can be comfortable while we work out any 
"639 
problems. You are not to speculate about any such discussions. They are necessary from 
time to time and help the trial run more smoothly. 
Some of you have probably heard the terms "circumstantial evidence," "direct 
evidence" and "hearsay evidence." Do not be concerned with these terms. You are to 
consider all the evidence admitted in this trial. 
However, the law does not require you to believe all the evidence. As the sole 
judges of the facts, you must determine what evidence you believe and what weight you 
attach to it. 
There is no magical formula by which one may evaluate testimony. You bring with 
you to this courtroom all of the experience and background of your lives. In your everyday 
affairs you determine for yourselves whom you believe, what you believe, and how much 
weight you attach to what you are told. The same considerations that you use in your 
everyday dealings in making these decisions are the considerations which you should 
-apply in your deliberations. 
In deciding what you believe, do not make your decision simply because more 
witnesses may have testified one way than the other. Your role is to think about the 
testimony of each witness you heard and decide how much you believe of what the witness 
had to say. 
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INSTRUCTION NO.~ 
Under our law and system of justice, the defendant is presumed to be innocent. 
The presumption of innocence means two things. 
First, the state has the burden of proving the defendant guilty. The state has that 
burden throughout the trial. The defendant is never required to prove his or her innocence, 
nor does the defendant ever have to produce any evidence at all. 
Second, the state must prove the alleged crime beyond a reasonable doubt. A 
reasonable doubt is not a mere possible or imaginary doubt. It is a doubt based on reason 
and common sense. It may arise from a careful and impartial consideration of all the 
evidence, or from lack of evidence. If after considering all the evidence you have a 
reasonable doubt about the defendant's guilt, you must find the defendant not guilty. 
INSTRUCTION NO. __ 
64 " 
INSTRUCTION NO.-=t-
If during the trial I may say or do anything which suggests to you that I am inclined 
to favor the claims or position of any party, you will not permit yourself to be influenced by 
any such suggestion. I will not express nor intend to express, nor will I intend to intimate, 
any opinion as to which witnesses are or are not worthy of belief; what facts are or are not 
established; or what inferences should be drawn from the evidence. If any expression of 
mine seems to indicate an opinion relating to any of these matters, I instruct you to 
disregard it. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. ~ 
Do not concern yourself with the subject of penalty or punishment. That subject 
must not in any way affect your verdict. If you find the defendant guilty, it will be my duty to 
determine the appropriate penalty or punishment. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. ~ 
If you wish, you may take notes to help you remember what witnesses said. If you 
do take notes, please keep them to yourself until you and your fellow jurors go to the jury 
room to decide the case. You should not let note-taking distract you so that you do not hear 
other answers by witnesses. When you leave at night, please leave your notes in the jury 
room. 
If you do not take notes, you should rely on your own memory of what was said and 
not be overly influenced by the notes of other jurors. In addition, you cannot assign to one 
person the duty of taking notes for all of you. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 7 
It is important that as jurors and officers of this court you obey the following 
instructions at any time you leave the jury box, whether it be for recesses of the court 
during the day or when you leave the courtroom to go home at night. 
First, do not talk about this case either among yourselves or with anyone else during 
the course of the trial. You should keep an open mind throughout the trial and not form or 
express an opinion about the case. You should only reach your decision after you have 
heard all the evidence, after you have heard my final instruction and after the final 
arguments. You may discuss this case with the other members of the jury only after it is 
submitted to you for your decision. All such discussion should take place in the jury room. 
Second, do not let any person talk about this case in your presence. If anyone does 
talk about it, tell them you are a juror on the case. If they won't stop talking, report that to 
the bailiff as soon as you are able to do so. You should not tell any of your fellow jurors 
about what has happened. 
Third, during this trial do not talk with any of the parties, their lawyers or any 
witnesses. By this, I mean not only do not talk about the case, but do not talk at all, even to 
pass the time of day. In no other way can all parties be assured of the fairness they are 
entitled to expect from you as jurors. 
Fourth, during this trial do not make any investigation of this case or inquiry outside 
of the courtroom on your own. Do not go any place mentioned in the testimony without an 
explicit order from me to do so. You must not consult any books, dictionaries, 
encyclopedias or any other source of information unless I specifically authorize you to do 
so. 
Fifth, do not read about the case in the newspapers. Do not listen to radio or 
television broadcasts about the trial. You must base your verdict solely on what is 645 
INSTRUCTION NO. ~ 
YOU ARE INSTRUCTED that the defendant, WILLIAM MICHAEL TANKOVICH, is 
charged in Count I with the crime of Malicious Harassment alleged to have been committed as 
follows: that the defendant, WILLIAM MICHAEL TA.NKOVICH, on or about the 16th day of 
August, 2009, in the County of Kootenai, State ofIdaho, did maliciously and with the specific intent 
to intimidate or harass another person because of that person's race and/or color and! or ancestry 
and/or national origin, threaten by word or act to cause physical injury to another person, to wit: 
Kenneth Requena, giving said person reasonable cause to believe the action would occur, or did aid 
and abet in the commission of said offense. To this charge the defendant has pled not guilty. 
646 
-_._---_._--_._--------------- ----- ----- ---.. ------------ -------------------: 
lNSTRUCTION NO. ~ 
YOU ARE lNSTRUCTED that the defendant, WITLIA1\l[ rvnCHAEL TANKOVICH, JR., is 
charged in Count II with the crime of Conspiracy to Commit Malicious Harassment alleged to have 
been committed as-follows: that the defendant, WILLIAM MICHAEL TANKOVICH, JR., on or 
about the 16th day of August, 2009, in the County of Kootenai, State of Idaho, did unlawfully, 
willfully and knowingly conspire and/or agree with Frank James Tankovich, and/or Ira Gino 
Tankovich to commit the crime of Malicious Harassment, in violation of I. C. § 18-7902. 
OVERT ACTS 
In furtherance of the conspiracy and to effect the objects thereof, t.1.e following overt acts, 
among others, were committed within Kootenai County: 
1. On or about the 16th day of August, 2009, after Ira Gino Tankovich had made 
contact with Kenneth Requena, he retumed to Kenneth Requena's home with a 
firearm to cause physical injury to Kenneth Requena lli'"1dior threaten by word or act 
to cause physical injury to Kenneth Reque~a, giving said person reasonable cause 
to believe the action would occur. 
2. On or about the 16th day of August, 2009, after Ira Gino Tankovich had made 
contact with Kenneth Requena, William Michael Tanl(Ovich, JI. and Frank James 
Tankovich returned to Kenneth Requena's home and maliciously and with the 
specific intent to intimidate or harass Kenneth Requena because of his race and/or 
color andior ancestry and/or national origin, made disparaging racial remarks to 
Kenneth Requena and did threaten by word or act to cause physical injury to 
Kenneth Requena, giving said person reasonable cause to believe the action would 
occur. 
To this charge the defendant has pled not guiltf. 
647 
INSTRUCTION NO . . 10 
YOU.ARE INSTRUCTED that the defendant, FRANK JAMES TA"IKOVICH, is charged in 
Count I with the crime of Malicious Harassment alleged to have been committed as follows: that the 
defendant, FRANK JAMES T ANKOVICH, on or about the 16th day of August, 2009, in the County 
of Kootenai, State of Idaho, did maliciously and with the specific intent to intimidate or harass 
another person because of that person's race and/or color and/or ancestry and/or national origin, 
threaten by word or act to cause physical injury to another person, to wit: Kenneth Requena, giving 
said person reasonable cause to believe the action would occur, or did aid and abet in the 
commission of said offense. To this charge the defendant has pled not guilty. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. -'_,_ 
YOU ARE INSTRUCTED that the defendant, FRANK JAMES TANKOVICH, IS 
charged in Count II with the crime of Conspiracy to Commit Malicious Harassment alleged to 
have been committ~d as follows: that the defendant, FRANK JAl\1ES TANKOVICH, on or 
about the 16th day of August, 2009, in the County of Kootenai , State ofIdaho, did unlawfully, 
willfully and knowingly conspire and/or agree with William Michael Tankovich, Jr., and/or Ira 
Gino Tankovich to commit the crime of Malicious Harassment, in violation ofLe. § 18-7902. 
OVERT ACTS 
In furtherance of the conspiracy and to effect the objects thereof, the following overt 
acts, among others, were committed within Kootenai County: 
1. On or about the 16th day of August, 2009, after Ira Gino TaTIkovich had 
made contact with Kenneth Requena, he returned to Kenneth Requena's 
home with a fIrearm to cause physical injury to Kelh"'1eth Requena and/or 
threaten by word or act to cause physical injury to Kenneth Requena, giving 
said person reasonable cause to believe the action would occur. 
2. On or about the 16th day of August, 2009, afterIra Gino Tank.ovich had 
made contact with Kenneth Requena, William N.fichael Tankovich, Jr. and 
Frank James Tankovich returned to Kenneth Requena's home and 
maliciously and with the specific intent to intimidate or harass Kenneth 
Requena because ofllis race and/or color and/or ancestry and/or national 
origin, made disparaging racial remarks to Kenneth Requena and did 
threaten by word or act to cause physical injury to Kenneth Requena, giving 
said person reasonable cause to believe the action would occur. 
To this charge the defendant has pled not guilty. 
649 
INSTRUCTION NO. ~ 
The Information in this case is of itself a mere accusation or charge against the 
defendant and does not of itself constitute any evidence of the defendant's guilt; you are 
not to be prejudiced or influenced to any extent against the defendant because a criminal 
charge has been made. 
650 
INSTRUCTION NO. t 3 
You are about to receive testimony from a witness relating to the possible 
meaning of certain tattoos that have been reflected in certain photos 
admitted into evidence. There has been no evidence of any tattoos on the 
person of Frank Tankovich. You should not consider the evidence about 
the tattoos in deciding the charge of Malicious Harassment against Frank 
Tankovich. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. I 1...1 
The defense has requested a JUry VIew of the scene. The court has 
permitted a jury VIew to assist the jurors in considering all of the 
evidence admitted in this case. Jurors will be transported by 
arrangements provided by the court. Neither the parties nor the 
attorneys will be present during the jury view. The jurors will be 
accompanied by the bailiff, Judge Luster and the deputy court clerk. 
Jurors will be permitted to walk about the public street and sidewalk but 
shall not walk upon any private property. There will be no description of 
the scene provided by court personnel nor shall any questions from the 
jury regarding the evidence in the case be considered. After the jury view 
is completed the jurors will be returned to the courtroom. 
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INSTRUCTION NO . .J~ 
You have now heard all the evidence in the case. My duty is to instruct you as to 
the law. 
You must follow all the rules as I explain them to you. You may not follow some and 
ignore others. Even if you disagree or don't understand the reasons for some of the rules, 
you are bound to follow them. If anyone states a rule of law different from any I tell you, it 
is my instruction that you must follow. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. _ J Co 
In order for the defendant, WILLIAM MICHAEL T ANKOVICH, to be guilty in Count I of 
Malicious Harassment, t.~e state must prove each of the following: 
1. On or about 16th day of August, 2009; 
2. in the state ofIdaho; 
3. the defendant, WILLIAM MICHAEL TANKOVICH, did maliciously threaten by 
word or act to cause physical injury to Kenneth Requena; 
4. with the specific intent to intimidate or harass Kenneth Requena because of Kenneth 
Requena's race and/or color and/or ancestry and/or nation origin; 
5. thereby giving Kenneth Requena reasonable cause to believe said physical injury 
would occur; 
6. or did aid and abet in the commission of said offense 
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must fmd the 
defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you must fmd 
the defendant guilty. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. t1 
In order for the defendant, WILLIAM MICHAEL TANKOVICH, JR., to be guilty in Count II of 
Conspiracy to Commit Malicious Harassment, the state must prove each of the following: 
1. On Gr about 16th day of August, 2009; 
2. in the state ofIdaho; 
3. the defendant, WILLIAM MICHAEL TANKOVICH, JR., agreed with Ira Gino Tankovich 
ancllor Frank James Tankovich; 
4. to commit the crime of malicious harassment; 
5. the defendant intended that the crime would be committed; 
6. one of the parties to the agreement performed at least one of the following acts: 
a. On or about the 16th day of August, 2009, after Ira Gino Tankovich, and/or 
Frank James Tankovich and/or William Michael Tankovich, Jr. made 
contact with Kenneth Requena, Ira Gino Tankovich returned to Kenneth 
Requena's home with a firearm. 
b. On or about the 16th day of August, 2009, after Ira Gino Tanlwvich, and/or 
Frank James Tan1wvichancllor William Michael Tankovich, Jr.made 
contact with Kenneth Requena, William Michael Tankovich, Jr. and Frank 
James Tankovich returned to Kenneth Requena's home and did threaten by 
word or act to cause physical injury to Kenneth Requena and made 
disparaging racial remarks in regards to Kenneth Requena. 
7. and such act was done for the purpose of carrying out the agreement 
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If any ofthe above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must fInd the defendant 
not guilty. If each of the above has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant 
guilty. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. lB 
In order for the defendant, FRANK JAMES TANKOvrCH, to be guilty in Count I of' 
Malicious Harassment, the state must prove each of the following: 
1. On or about 16th day of August, 2009; 
2. in the state of Idaho; 
3. the defendant, FRANK JAMES T ANKOVICH, did maliciously threaten by word or 
act to cause physical injury to Kenneth Requena; 
4. with the specific intent to intimidate or harass Kenneth Requena because of Kenneth 
Requena's race and/or color and/or ancestry and/or nation origin; 
5. thereby giving Kenneth Requena reasonable cause to believe said physical injury 
would occur; 
6. or did aid and abet in the commission of said offense 
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the 
defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you must fmd 
the defendant guilty. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. -' I CL 
In order for the defendant, FRANK JAMES TANKOVICH, to be guilty in Count II of 
Conspiracy to Commit Malicious Harassment, the state must prove each of the following: 
1. On or about 16th day of August, 2009; 
2. in the state ofIdaho; 
3. the defendant, FRANK JAMES Ti-\NKOVICH, agreed with Ira Gino Tankovich 
and/or William Michael Tankovich, JI.; 
4. to commit the crime of malicious harassment; 
5. the defendant intended that the crime would be committed; 
6. one of the parties to the agreement performed at least one of the following acts: 
a. On or about the 16th day of August, 2009, after Ira Gino Tankovich, 
and/or Frank James Tankovich and/or William Michael Tankovich, 
JI. made contact with Kenneth Requena, Ira Gino Tankovich 
returned to Kenneth Requena's home with a firearm. 
b. On or about the 16th day of August, 2009, after Ira Gino Tankovich, 
and/or Frank James Tankovich and/or William Michael Tankovich, 
JI. made contact with Kenneth Requena, William Michael 
Tankovich, Jr. and Frank James Tankovich returned to Kenneth 
Requena's home and did threaten by word or act to cause physical 
injury to Kenneth Requena and made disparaging racial remarks in 
regards to Kenneth Requena. 
7. and such act was done for the purpose of carrying out the agreement 
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must fmd the 
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defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you must fmd 
the defendant guilty. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 20 
The crime of Conspiracy involves an agreement by two or more persons to commit a 
crime. They need not agree upon every detail. The agreement may be established in any manner 
sufficient to show an understanding of the parties to the agreement. It may be shown by evidence 
of an oral or written agreement, or may be implied from the conduct of the parties. It does not 
matter whether the crime agreed upon was actually committed. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. ~ I 
All of the parties to a conspiracy need not enter into the agreement at the same time. A 
person who later joins an already formed conspiracy with knowledge of its unlawful purpose is a 
party to the conspiracy. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. _ ~ ~ 
The word If defendant" as used in these instructions applies equally to each defendant 
except as you may be otherwise instructed. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. - ~3 
"Malice" and "maliciously" mean the desire to annoy or injure another or the intent to do 
a wrongful act. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. "'''-' 
All persons who participate in a crime either before or during its commission, by 
intentionally aiding, abetting, advising, hiring, cOllilseling, procuring another to commit the crime 
with intent to promote or assist in its commission are guilty of the crime. All such participants 
are considered principals in the commission of the crime. The participation of each defendant in 
the crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. _~.s 
The law makes no distinction between a person who directly participates in the acts 
constituting a crime and a person who, either before or during its commission, intentionally aids, 
assists, facilitates, promotes, encourages, counsels, solicits, invites, helps or hires another to 
commit a crime with intent to promote or assist in its commission. Both can be found guilty of 
the crime. Mere presence at, acquiescence in, or silent consent to, the planning or commission of 
a crime is not in the absence of a duty to act sufficient to make one an accomplice. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. _~~ 
You must give separate, personal consideration to the charge against 
each defendant. Each is entitled to a verdict based upon the evidence and the 
law which applies to that defendant. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. ~7 
Each count charges a separate and distinct offense. You must decide 
each count separately on the evidence and the law that applies to it, 
uninfluenced by your decision as to any other count. A defendant charged with 
two offenses may be found guilty or not guilty on either or both of the offenses 
charged. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. ~e 
In every crime or public offense there must exist a union or joint operation of act and 
intent. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. ~q 
It is alleged that the crime charged was committed "on or about" a certain date. If 
you find the crime was committed, the proof need not show that it was committed on that 
precise date. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 3D 
A defendant in a criminal trial has a constitutional right not to be compelled to testify. 
The decision whether to testify is left to the defendant, acting with the advice and 
assistance of the defendant's lawyer. You must not draw any inference of guilt from the 
fact that the defendant does not testify, nor should this fact be discussed by you or enter 
into your deliberations in any way. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 31-
If your unanimous verdict is that the Defendant, William M. Tankovich is not guilty of 
Malicious Harassment, you must acquit him of that charge. In that event, you must next consider 
the included offense of Disturbing the Peace. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 3A. 
In order for the Defendant, William M. Tankovich, Jr., to be guilty of the offense 
of Disturbing the Peace, the state must prove each of the following: 
1. On or about August 16, 2009 
2. In the state of Idaho 
3. the Defendant, William Tankovich maliciously and willfully 
4. disturbed the peace or quiet of Kenneth Requena 
5. by tumultuous or offensive conduct or by threatening, traducing, 
quarreling, or challenging Kenneth Requena to fight. 
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find 
the Defendant William M. Tankovich, Jr. not guilty of Disturbing the Peace. If each of 
the above has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the Defendant, 
William M. Tankovich, Jr. guilty of Disturbing the Peace. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3.3 
If your unanimous verdict is that the Defendant, William M. Tankovich, Jr., is not guilty 
of Conspiracy to Commit Malicious Harassment, you must acquit him of that charge. In that 
event, you must next consider the included offense of Conspiracy to Conunit Disturbing the 
Peace. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. --3 '1 
In order for the Defendant, William M. Tankovicb, Jr. to be guilty ofthe offense of 
Conspiracy to Commit Disturbing the Peace, the state must prove each of the following: 
1. On or about August 16, 2009 
2. In the state of Idaho 
3. the Defendant, William M. Tankovich, Jr. agreed with Ira Tankovick and/or 
Frank Tankovich. 
4. to commit the crime of Disturbing the Peace against Kenneth Requena 
5. Defendant, William M. Tankovich, Jr., intended that the crime of Disturbing the 
Peace would be committed 
6. one of the parties to the agreement performed at least one act in furtherance of the 
crime of Disturbing the Peace, and 
7 • such act was done for the purpose of carry I ng au t the agreement. 
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the 
Defendant, William M. Tankovich, Jr. not guilty of Conspiracy to Commit Disturbing the Peace. 
If each of the above has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the Defendant, 
William M. Tankovich, Jr., guilty of Conspiracy to Commie Disttlrbing the Peace. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. -3.5. 
If your unanimous verdict is that the Defendant, Frank Tankovich is not guilty of 
Malicious Harassment, you must acquit him of that charge. In that event, you must next consider 
the included offense of Disturbing the Peace. 
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INSTRUCTION NO . .3 '=> 
In order for the Defendant, Frank Tankovich to be guilty of the offense of Disturbing the 
Peace, the state must prove each of the following: 
1. On or about August 16,2009 
2. In the state of Idaho 
3. the Defendant, Frank Tankovich maliciously and willfully 
4. disturbed the peace or quiet of Kenneth Requena 
5. by tumultuous or offensive conduct or by threatening, traducing, quarreling, or 
challenging Kenneth Requena to fight. 
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the 
Defendant, Frank Tankovich not guilty of Disturbing the Peace. If each of the above has been 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the Defendant, Frank Tankovich guilty of 
Disturbing the Peace. 
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INSTRUCTION NO, 37 
If your unanimous verdict is that the Defendant, Frank Tankovich is not guilty of 
Conspiracy to Commit Malicious Harassment, you must acquit him of that charge. In that event, 
you must next consider the included offense of Conspiracy to Commit Disturbing the Peace. 
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INSTRUCTION NO . . 3S 
In order for the Defendant, Frank Tankovich to be guilty of the offense of Conspiracy to 
Commit Disturbing the Peace, the state must prove each of the following: 
1. On or about August 16,2009 
2. In the state of Idaho 
3. the Defendant, Frank Tankovich, agreed witb Ira Tankovick and/or William 
Tankovich, Jr. 
4. to commit the crime of Disturbing the Peace against Kenneth Requena 
5. Defendant, Frank Tankovich intended that the crime of Disturbing the Peace 
would be committed 
6 • one of the parties to the agreement performed at least one act in furtherance of the 
crime of Disturbing the Peace, and 
7 • such act was done for the purpose of carryi ng out the agreement. 
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the 
Defendant, Frank Tanlwvich not guilty of Conspiracy to Commit Disturbing the Peace. If each 
of the above has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the Defendant, Frank 
Tankovich guilty of Conspiracy to Commit Disturbing the Peace: 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 3«; 
It is for you, the jury, to detem1ine from all the evi dence in this case, applying the law as 
given in these instructions, whether Defendant, William J\f. Tankovich, Jr., is guilty or not guilty 
of the offenses charged or of any included offense. 
With respect to the facts alleged in Count I of the Indictment, the offense of Malicious 
Harassment includes the offense of Disturbing the Peace. rt is possible for you to return on 
Count I anyone, but only one of the following verdicts: 
GUILTY of Malicious Harassment 
_ GUILTY of Disturbing the Peace 
NOT GUILTY. 
With respect to the facts alleged in Count II of the hdictment , the offense of Conspiracy 
to Commit Malicious Harassment includes the offense of Conspiracy to Commit Disturbing the 
Peace. It is possible for you to return on Count II anyone. but only one of the following verdicts: 
__ GUILTY of Conspiracy to Commit Maliciou,; Harassment 
_ GUILTY of Conspiracy to Commit Disturbing the Peace 
NOT GUILTY . 
When you are deliberating you should first cOl1sid'~r the crime charged. You should 
consider the included offenses in the order listed only in he event the state has failed to convince 
you beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt wi [h respect to the crime charged and 
each preceding included offense. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. _ L.{ 0 
It is for you, the jury, to determine from all the evidence in this case, applying the law as 
given in these instructions, whether Defendant, Frank Tankovicb is guilty or not guilty of the 
offenses charged or of any included offense. 
With respect to the facts alleged in Count I of the Indictment, the offense of Malicious 
Harassment includes the offense of Disturbing the Peace. (j is possible for you to return on 
COlmt I anyone, but only one of the following verdicts: 
GUIL TY of Malicious Harassment 
_ GUILTY of Disturbing the Peace 
NOT GUILTY . 
With respect to the facts alleged in Count n ofthe Indictment, the offense of Conspiracy 
to Conunit Malicious Harassment includes the offense of Conspiracy to Commit Disturbing the 
Peace. It is possible for you to retum on Count II anyone Lut only ,jne of the following verdicts: 
__ GUILTY of Conspiracy to Commit NralicioLl:, !-iarassl1lcnt 
_ GUILTY of Conspiracy to Commit Disturbing rhc Peace 
NOT GUILTY . 
When you are deliberating you should first consjd~r the crime charged. You should 
consider the included offenses in the order listed only in t:1C event the state has failed to convince 
you beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt 'vvith respect to the crime charged and 
each preceding included offense. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. -=tl 
As members of the jury it is your duty to decide what the facts are and to apply 
those facts to the law that I have given you. You are to decide the facts from all the 
evidence presented in the case. 
The evidence you are to consider consists of: 
1. sworn testimony of witnesses; 
2. exhibits which have been admitted into evidence; and 
3. any facts to which the parties have stipulated. 
Certain things you have heard or seen are not evidence, including: 
1. arguments and statements by lawyers. The lawyers are not witnesses. 
What they say in their opening statements, closing arguments and at other 
times is included to help you interpret the evidence, but is not evidence. If 
the facts as you remember them differ from the way the lawyers have stated 
them, follow your memory; 
2. testimony that has been excluded or stricken, or which you have been 
instructed to disregard; 
3. anything you may have seen or heard when the court was not in session. 
In deciding the facts of this case, you will have to decide which witnesses to believe 
and which witnesses not to believe. You may believe anything a witness says or only part 
of it or none of it. In making your decision, you may take into account a number of factors 
including the following: 
1. Was the witness able to see, or hear, or know the things about which that 
witness testified? 
2. How well was the witness able to recal! and describe those things? 
3. What was the witness's manner while testifying? 
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4. Did the witness have an interest in the outcome of this case or any bias or 
prejudice concerning any party or any matter involved in the case? 
5. How reasonable was the witness's testimony considered in light of all the 
evidence in the case? 
6. Was the witness's testimony contradicted by what that witness has said or done 
at another time, or by the testimony of other witnesses or by other evidence? 
In deciding whether or not to believe a witness, keep in mind that people sometimes 
forget things. You need to consider therefore whether a contradiction is an innocent lapse 
of memory or an intentional falsehood, and that may depend on whether it has to do with 
an important fact or with only a small detail. 
The weight of the evidence presented by each side does not necessarily depend on 
the number of witnesses testifying on one side or the other. You must consider all the 
evidence in the case, and you may decide that the testimony of a smaller number of 
witnesses on one side has greater weight than that of ~ larger number on the other. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. (../ " 
I have outlined for you the rules of law applicable to this case and have told you of 
some of the matters which you may consider in weighing the evidence to determine the 
facts. In a few minutes counsel will present their closing remarks to you, and then you will 
retire to the jury room for your deliberations. 
The arguments and statements of the attorneys are not evidence. If you remember 
the facts differently from the way the attorneys have stated them, you should base your 
decision on what you remember. 
The attitude and conduct of jurors at the beginning of your deliberations are 
important. It is rarely productive at the outset for you to make an emphatic expression of 
your opinion on the case or to state how you intend to vote. When you do that at the 
beginning, your sense of pride may be aroused, and you may hesitate to change your 
position even if shown that it is wrong. Remember that you are not partisans or advocates, 
but are judges. For you, as for me, there can be no triumph except in the ascertainment 
and declaration of the truth. 
As jurors you have a duty to consult with one another and to deliberate before 
making your individual decisions. You may fully and fairly discuss among yourselves all of 
the evidence you have seen and heard in this courtroom about this case, together with the 
law that relates to this case as contained in these instructions. 
During your deliberations, you each have a right to re-examine your own views and 
change your opinion. You should only do so if you are convinced by fair and honest 
discussion that your original opinion was incorrect based upon the evidence the jury saw 
and heard during the trial and the law as given you in these instructions. 
Consult with one another. Consider each other's views, and deliberate with the 
objective of reaching an agreement, if you can do so without disturbing your individual 683 
judgment. Each of you must decide this case for yourself; but you should do so only after a 
discussion and consideration of the case with your fellow jurors. 
However, none of you should surrender your honest opinion as to the weight or 
effect of evidence or as to the innocence or guilt of the defendant because the majority of 
the jury feels otherwise or for the purpose of returning a unanimous verdict. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. ~ 
You have been instructed as to all the rules of law that may be necessary for you to 
reach a verdict. Whether some of the instructions apply will depend upon your 
determination of the facts. You will disregard any instruction which applies to a state of 
facts which you determine does not exist. You must not conclude from the fact that an 
instruction has been given that the Court is expressing any opinion as to the facts. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. ~ 
Upon retiring to the jury room, select one of you as a presiding juror, who will 
preside over your deliberations. It is that person's duty to see that discussion is orderly; 
that the issues submitted for your decision are fully and fairly discussed; and that every 
juror has a chance to express himself or herself upon each question. 
In this case, your verdict must be unanimous. When you all arrive at a verdict, the 
presiding juror will sign it and you will return it into open court. 
Your verdict in this case cannot be arrived at by chance, by lot, or by compromise. 
If, after considering all of the instructions in their entirety, and after having fully 
discussed the evidence before you, the jury determines that it is necessary to communicate 
with me, you may send a note by the bailiff. You are not to reveal to me or anyone else 
how the jury stands until you have reached a verdict or unless you are instructed by me to 
do so. 
A verdict form suitable to any conclusion you may reach will be submitted to you 
with these instructions. 
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BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
COMES NOW, Arthur Verharen, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Kootenai County, and 
hereby submits the state's Brief in Opposition to Motion for New Trial. 
APPLICABLE LAW AND ARGUMENT 
I.C.R. 34 imposes a fourteen day time constraint on a motion for a new trial for reasons 
other than newly discovered evidence. A motion made under the rule is left to the discretion of 
the trial court, however, I.C 19-2406 does set out statutory limits under which the motion must 
fall. State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 397 (Ct. App. 2000). The statute sets out seven specific 
instances where a trial court may grant a new trial. Those are the only grounds for which a new 
trial may be ordered. State v. Curless, 137 Idaho 138, 142 (Ct. App. 2002). Although not cited 
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by the defense, the grounds for a new trial asserted in this matter appear to fall under three of the 
seven possible grounds. The first basis, under LC. 19-2406(3), deals with juror misconduct. 
I.R.E. 606(b) specifically delineates what may not be delved into in terms of juror 
inquiries pertaining to deliberations. The rule mandates that trial courts not allow a juror to 
testify about what was said during deliberations or whether there was something that occurred 
during deliberations that may have affected a juror or influenced their verdict. I.R.E. 606(b). The 
rule does contemplate inquiry of a juror, however that questioning is very limited: 
Pursuant to this rule, a jury's verdict may not be impeached by a juror's affidavit 
or otherwise except on the grounds that: (1) extraneous prejudicial information 
was improperly brought to the jury's attention, (2) outside influence was 
improperly brought to bear on ajuror, or (3) the verdict was determined by resort 
to chance. Statements regarding any other aspect of the jury's deliberations are 
inadmissible to impeach the jury's verdict. State v. Webster, 123 Idaho 233, 238 
(Ct. App.1993) citing State v. Burnside, 115 Idaho 882, 886 (Ct.App.1989). 
Following the verdict in our case a juror was interrogated in the Court's chambers at 
length about issues that did not deal with either extraneous prejudicial information, outside 
influence or whether the verdict was rendered through compromise or chance. The focus of the 
interrogation of the juror was whether he was coerced into his verdict by the other jurors. The 
state objected to this process. In-Chambers Inquiry ({[Juror Transcript, p. 3.. Nonetheless, at the 
request of the defense, the Court proceeded with its inquiry of the juror. This was clearly not 
permissible under the Idaho Rules of Evidence and existing Idaho case law. Thus, the statements 
from the juror that dealt with issues that arose from within the jury during deliberations should 
not be considered because the entire process was in violation of the law. As such, there is no 
evidentiary basis to conclude there was juror misconduct and the motion before the Court should 
be denied. 
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In the event that I.RE. 606(b) is not considered in this matter then the pertinent burden of 
proof, clear and convincing evidence, applicable to establishing juror misconduct, is borne by the 
defendant. State v. Strange, 147 Idaho 686, 689 (Ct. App. 2009). In order to prevail, the 
defendant has to show that the alleged misconduct "could have prejudiced the defendant." Id. 
In addition, "[ w Jhere the trial court denies a motion for new trial after conducting an evidentiary 
hearing, we defer to the courtls findings of fact." Jd. Claims of juror coercion in the context of 
deliberations are examined under a totality of the circumstances anal ysis. State v. Lee, 131 Idaho 
600,606 (et. App. 1998). There are a number of factors that may come into play such as 
whether the trial court's instructions to the jury placed undue pressure on a juror or the length of 
time it takes the jury to return a verdict once excused. Id at 607. The ultimate inquiry is whether 
the trial court's handling of the matter was an abuse of discretion: 
Therefore, for our review, we apply a totality of the circumstances test, 
conducting an independent analysis based on the facts of Lee IS case to determine 
if the actions of the district court constituted an abuse of discretion, Id. 
As indicated, it is the state's position that the Cou,rt's post-trial debriefing of the 
juror as to whether he was coerced into his verdict contravened I.RE. 606(b), In that 
sense the Court. clearly abused its discretion. However, the Defendants should not be 
entitled to a new trial simply because the Court violated the law. The interrogation of the 
juror in the Court's chambers was a procedure that occurred following the verdicts and 
did not happen while the jury was in deliberations. Thus the interrogation, while in 
violation of the law, had no effect on the verdicts that were rendered in this case and 
cannot serve as a basis for a new trial. 
In the event the Court deems otherwise, then it is the state's position that there 
was no evidence adduced at the post-trial juror interrogation to support the defense 
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assertions of coercion. The defense has argued that the presiding juror "halted the 
proceedings" in order to "intimidate other jurors and taint the deliberation process." The 
defense goes on to state that the presiding grand juror utilized "guilt, recrimination, 
harassment and the false display of authority" and behaved as "a bully." These rather 
dramatic proclamations apparently derive from a completely subjective view of the 
presiding juror's intentions without any factual basis. In other words, there is absolutely 
no evidence to support the inference that the presiding juror intended to intimidate other 
jurors and mar deliberations. 
The presiding grand juror brought to the Court's attention an issue concerning 
another juror's forthrightness during voir dire. Her concern was understandable in terms 
of the nature of the offenses charged and the other juror's beliefs that were not addressed 
while the jury was selected. Nonetheless, even when the post-trial juror interrogation is 
considered, the record is devoid of a factual basis to support the defense view of the 
presiding juror's intentions and the applicable burden of proof, clear and convincing 
evidence, has not been met. 
The second basis alleged by the Defendants as grounds for a new trial is that the verdict was 
invalid. Similar to the first basis, the Defendants do not allege under what subsection ofI.C. 19-
2406 this claim falls because their motions cite to no statute or case law. An "invalid verdict" 
could arguably fall within subsection (4) or (6) ofI.C. 19-2406. Again, it is the state's position 
that the post-trial interrogation of the juror of issues that may have arisen during deliberations 
violated the law and should not be considered as an evidentiary basis for granting a new trial. 
If, for whatever reason, the Court decides to examine the defense argument in spite of LR.E. 
606(b) then it is the state's position that there is no basis to conclude the jury reached an "invalid 
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verdict." The juror that was interrogated in the Court's chambers indicated that although he may 
have personally felt otherwise, under the law the Defendants' were guilty. In-Chambers Inquiry 
qf Juror Transcript, p. 13. Despite the repeated, leading questions during the interrogation he 
maintained this position. In other words, it became clear at the interrogation of the juror that he 
had followed the Court's instructions and applied the law to the evidence and in that fashion 
rendered his verdict. Under those circumstances, there is no basis to find that the verdicts were 
in any sense deficient. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, the state respectfully requests the Court deny the Motion for a 
New Trial. 
~/(~ 
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Calls cases - PA VerHaren, DA Schwartz, DA Whitaker 
present with defendants not in custody. I know the issues 
involve alleged issues of jury misconduct - I would 
appreciate it if we'd refer to the jurors as Presiding juror and 
Juror #6 to keep personal identification confidential. 
The state focused on the questioning of the specific juror 
but I want to focus on when the deliberation was stopped -
presiding juror halted deliberations - the presiding juror 
becomes the courts eyes. The presiding juror stopped 
deliberation and destroyed the whole process. There was 
no justification or legal authority for taking that type of 
procedure by the presiding juror. We cannot unring that 
bell. The state's goal is supposed to be justice and not 
winning and had the previous trial resulted in this then PA 
would have been on the other side of the argument 
I looked at the instructions (reads instruction in question) 
Taking a look at the transcript of juror questioning. I agree 
with DA Schwartz - the presiding juror stepped out of her 
role. In the interests of justice my client deserves a new 
trial. My client is asking for a fair trial and a fair verdict. I 
ask you to use your discretion and order a new trial. 
The thrust of the argument is that this juror was coerced. 
IRE 606(b) - there was no question whether or not there 
was prejudicial information brought on this juror or that it 
was brought on by chance. This situation was clearly 
designed to figure out if the juror suffered coercion. IRE 
606(b) - it is clear that the juror was not coerced. He said it 
was his personal opinion but applied the facts of this case. 
He was pretty clear that coercion or intimidation did not 
take place in this case. I don't think the procedure the court 
took in questioning the juror was proper - it's clear that the 
juror simply applied the law - deny the motion. 
I 09:20:19 AM I CHRISTOPHER PA brings up the Idaho Rules re: juries but you should also 
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apply the statute - the presiding juror did halt deliberations 
You've got the transcript - the fact that this juror stood up to 
the jurors for an hour and then bended is relevant -
transcript page 10. Reads question and answer Or juror. It's 
clear the verdict was rendered due to pressure from the 
presiding juror. I don't think defendant got a good shake 
here and I ask for a new trial. 
The motion is brought under Rule 34 - This case from initial 
inception has been an unusual process. This is just another 
unusual twist of what has been an unusual case. I've had a 
lot of questions asked by jurors as to the process but never 
have I had an inquiry from the presiding juror - she 
basically stopped deliberations and decided to bring to this 
court's attention the attitude or behavior of juror #6. This 
court didn't feel it appropriate to stop deliberations but to 
direct deliberation to continue. The court felt this 
appropriate to avoid any undue influence or intimidation 
due to the courts inquiry to compound that of the presiding 
juror. The court is aware that Rule 606(b) prohibits inquiry 
into validity of the verdict. I don't know that what the court 
did in this case was a prohibition of 606(b). The crux is 
what the impact was of the actions of the presiding juror. 
That juror was entrusted with the duty to make sure the 
issue was fully and fairly discussed and every juror can 
express him or herself. I don't know that the duties of the 
presiding juror include being a traffic cop for the court. The 
court should ponder the issue if a new trial should be 
granted. MATTER SUBMITTED. I may generate an order 
resetting sentencing 
I don't' believe my client's PSI has been prepared 
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CR - 09 - 22648 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS 
FOR NEW TRIAL 
WILLIAM M. TANKOVICH, Jr. and 
FRANK J. TANKOVICH, 
Defendants. 
A jury convicted the Defendants of two felony counts. Each of the 
Defendants request a new trial, alleging the presiding juror engaged in 
misconduct. The State objects to the Defendants' request for a new trial. 
Art Verharen, Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney's Office, for the State 
of Idaho. 
Christopher D. Schwartz, Schwartz Law Office, P.C., for Defendant 
William M. Tankovich. 
Jedediah J. Whitaker, Kootenai County Public Defender's Office, for 
Defendant Frank J. Tankovich. 
I. STATEMENT OF FACTS AND COURSE OF PROCEDURE 
On November 2, 2009, a grand jury indicted William M. Tankovich, Jr., and his 
brother Frank J. Tankovich ("Defendants"), charging the Defendants with one count 
each of Malicious Harassment (I.C. §§ 18-7902, and 18-204) and Conspiracy to Commit 
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Malicious Harassment (I.C. §§ 18-7902, 18-1791). Trial commenced on October 25, 
2010, and the jury began deliberations on October 28, 2010. 1 After the jurors began 
deliberating, the Presiding Juror sent a note to this Court stating: 
It was disclosed in our deliberations Oust now) that Juror # 6 [name 
omitted], has disclosed some views that (sic) Judge may need to question. 
We will cease deliberations until further instruction from the Judge. 
(Presiding Juror's Note #1.) The State and the Defendants agreed that it would be 
appropriate to conduct a preliminary inquiry of the Presiding Juror to obtain more 
information. (10/28/102:12 p.m. Tr., p.68, L.17 - p.69, L.6.) This Court then called the 
Presiding Juror into the courtroom with counsel for all parties present. (10/28/102:12 







And hello, [Presiding Juror]. 
Hi. 
I understand you received the honors, and you 
are the presiding juror. Is that correct? 
I am. 
[Presiding Juror], the Court received a note 
from you, and it's not really a question to the 
Court; it's simply a note. And I' can't really 
discern from looking at this note what the 
concern of the jury is or of yourself as a 
presiding juror, so I don't even know if its' an 
issue I can even concern myself with unless I 
have a little bit more information. 
And I can be frank? 
I The State charged the Defendants' brother, Ira Tankovich, with the same offenses (CR-09-22657). The 
three brothers were tried together for the first time on March 29, 2010. However, a mistrial was declared 
on March 30, 2010. The second trial commenced on April 12,2010. The jury found Ira Tankovich guilty 
of the misdemeanor offense of Conspiracy to Commit Disturbing the Peace (I.C. §§ I.C. 18-1719 and 18-
6409), but found him not guilty of Malicious Harassment (I.C. §§ 18-7902, 18-204) and Conspiracy to 
Commit Malicious Harassment (I.C. §§ 18-7902, 1791). However, the jury could not reach a decision 
regarding the charges against the Defendants. This Opinion addresses events that occurred during the 
third trial of the Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR NEW 






I want you to be frank, and I may stop you if 
there's a concern that you're raising, but go 
ahead and just tell us what's behind this letter. 
In the middle of deliberations, all of us taking 
into account everything that we're w-hat we're 
supposed to be doing, it was disclosed to me 
by Juror #6, [name omitted], that [Juror #6] has 
engaged with his - he talks about when he was 
with his buddies and they do all kinds of things 
like write "white power" and such and such - I 
can't remember the other things he described -
on his truck when they go mudding or 
something. 
And up and to that, I was trying to engage 
[Juror #6] to talk, because he's not very 
talkative, and he disclosed that to me 
personally. I disclosed it to the rest of the 
jurors, and we felt that it was possibly an 
oversight in the beginning and that you should 
perhaps take over to talk with, and we ceased 
our deliberations. 
So, he - then other jurors did ask him about his 
views,and he said - you know, asked him if he 
was racist. And he said, well, I'm not all the 
way racist, but you know, that kind of thing. 
So, again, we stopped and I asked that I 
needed to let you know. 
All right. Do you have any other information 
beyond that? 
I do not. I asked everybody to stop. 
(10/28/10 2:12 p.m. Tr., p.70, L.13 - p.72, L.8.) Counsel for the State and for the 
Defendants declined to inquire further of the Presiding Juror, and this Court asked the 
Presiding Juror to return to the jury room and wait for this Court's response. (10/28/10 
2:12 p.m. Tr., p.72, Ls.9-22.) 
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The State then moved to strike Juror #6 pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 
24(d)(3), arguing Juror #6 was "disabled" because Juror #6 did not respond to the 
State's voir dire questions regarding whether he could sit as a fair and impartial juror. 
(10/28/102:29 p.m. Tr., p.1, L.9 - p.3, L.2.) The State requested that this Court replace 
Juror #6 with an alternate juror, or, the State suggested, this situation "maybe might 
even require some additional inquiry by the Court, specifically of [Juror #6] to determine 
whether or not he is able to sit as a fair and impartial juror." (10/28/10 2:29 p.m. Tr., 
p.1, Ls.17-22.; see, p.2, L.23 - p.3-L2.) 
Counsel for the Defendants responded that Juror #6 should not be dismissed 
because he answered all voir dire questions put to him, and because the State did not 
ask any of the jurors during voir dire if they harbored beliefs that "one race is better than 
the other," or other like ideologies. (10/28/10 2:29 p.m. Tr., p.3, L.4 - p.4, L.13.) 
Defense counsel also stated: 
[t]o be frank, your Honor, I have almost more of a problem with the 
presiding juror's response than what [Juror #6] has supposedly said. The 
idea that we're going to stop jury deliberations and ask a juror, "Are you 
racist," completely taints the jury pool, completely destroys any ability of 
my client to get a fair jury panel. Now they're discussing whether racism is 
appropriate, not the facts of this case. They're fighting with each other, not 
discussing the facts of the case, and I have no other choice, your Honor, 
than to move for a mistrial. 
(10/28/102:29 p.m. Tr., p.4, Ls.1-13.) 
This Court denied the State's motion to strike Juror #6 because, based on the 
limited information available, there is 
nothing that [the Presiding Juror] offered to indicate to this Court that 
[Juror #6] has lied during voir dire about ... those two fundamental areas 
of inquiry by the State .... The fact that Juror #6 may have exhibited or 
may possess some kinds of beliefs that might be considered inappropriate 
or perhaps racial beliefs does not automatically indicate that he's 
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incapable of being fair and impartial for the purposes of this trial. 
(10/28/102:29 p.m. Tr., p.?, L.19 - p.8, L.3.) 
This Court also denied the Defendants' motion for a mistrial, stating: 
I actually share some of the concerns here that I have a presiding juror 
that somehow wants to stop the deliberations when they come across a 
situation where they feel that someone may harbor beliefs that they either 
don't - that they simply don't agree with. I'll give [the Presiding Juror] the 
benefit of the doubt because of the way she voiced her concern in her 
question. It seemed it was more related to the voir dire process. And I 
think having examined that, I'm not sure that [Juror #6], based on what 
[the Presiding Juror] has told us, has violated that duty. 
I don't want to bring [Juror #6] back in front of the Court and ask any 
further questions of him, because I think that would present a dangerous 
situation, because I don't want to single out [Juror #6] in any way that he 
hasn't otherwise been singled out by this whole process and to somehow 
put some kind of leverage upon the young man to try to explain to him that 
he's supposed to change his beliefs or his personal attitudes for the 
purposes of this trial. 
And so I'm just simply not satisfied that I have enough information to 
conclude that [Juror #6] has either violated his oath as a juror during the 
selection process nor has he displayed, based on what I received here 
from [the Presiding Juror] that he is incapable of being a fair and impartial 
juror. 
(10128/10 2:29 p.m. Tr., p.8, L.24 - p.10, L.3.) This Court agreed that after the jury 
reached a verdict, this Court would consider a request from counsel to inquire of the 
jurors. (10/28/102:29 p.m. Tr., p.13, Ls.14-25.) 
This Court then responded to the Presiding Juror's note with a note stating: 
"[t]he court has conferred on this issue and does not find any basis to cease the 
deliberations. Please resume your deliberations." (Presiding Juror's Note #1.) After 
further deliberations, the jury returned a verdict finding the Defendants guilty of all 
charges. 
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After the verdict, counsel for the Defendants requested an opportunity to inquire 
of the Presiding Juror and Juror #6. (10/28/104:30 p.m. Tr., p.3, Ls.4-12.) The State 
objected, arguing the inquiry invades the province of the jury. (10/28/104:30 p.m. Tr., 
p.3, Ls.16-24.) This Court allowed the inquiry to determine if there is any "additional 
information beyond that which we had received from [the Presiding Juror] that is of 
concern," because "the interests of justice would merit that we make some at least 
limited inquiry into it." (10/28/104:30 p.m. Tr., p.4, Ls.12-16.) This Court, and counsel 
for all the parties then inquired of Juror #6. (10/28/104:30 p.m. Tr., p.5, L.11 - p.22.) 
The Defendants now timely move for a new trial ("Defendants' Motions"). 
II. ANALYSIS 
A. Information Obtained During the Post-Verdict Inquiry of Juror #6 is 
Inadmissible Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 606(b). 
The State opposes the Defendants' Motions ("State's Brief'), arguing that Idaho 
Rule of Evidence 606(b) prohibits a post-verdict inquiry of Juror #6, and that this Court 
may not consider the information gleaned from the post-verdict inquiry of Juror #6 in its 
analysis of whether the Defendants are entitled to a new trial. (State's Brief, pp.1-4.) 
Rule 606(b) provides: 
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not 
testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the 
jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon the juror's or any other 
juror's mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent 
from the verdict or indictment or concerning the juror's mental processes 
in connection therewith, nor maya juror's affidavit or evidence of any 
statement by the juror concerning a matter about which the juror would be 
precluded from testifying be received for these purposes, but a juror may 
testify on the questions whether extraneous prejudicial information was 
improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside influence 
was improperly brought to bear upon any juror and may be questioned 
about or may execute and affidavit on the issue of whether or not the jury 
determined any issue by resort to chance. 
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Statements regarding any other aspect of the jury's deliberations are inadmissible to 
impeach the jury's verdict. State v. Webster, 123 Idaho 233, 238, 846 P.2d 235, 240 
(Ct. App. 1993). The reason for excluding evidence attempting to impeach the verdict 
include insuring the freedom of deliberations, the stability and finality of verdicts, and the 
protection of jurors. Lehmkuhl v. Booland, 114 Idaho 503, 757 P.2d 1222 (Ct. App. 
1988). 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 606(b) is a rule of evidence, and not a prohibition of post-
verdict inquiries. Case law shows that post-verdict inquires occur in many instances, 
but that trial courts must take care when considering the resulting information as 
evidence in support of a defendant's motion for a new trial and avoid conducting- the 
inquiry in a manner that taints a jury's ability to deliberate. Compare State v. Seiber, 
117 Idaho 637, 791 P.2d 18 (1990) (post-verdict inquiry into the potential undisclosed 
bias of a juror) with State v. Lee, 131 Idaho 600, 961 P.2d 1203 (1998) (post-verdict 
inquiry of a juror improper when the court instructed the jurors to deliberate after jury 
was polled and inquiry complete). This Court's post-verdict inquiry of Juror #6 was, 
therefore, proper because the inquiry was limited to the issue presented by the 
Presiding Juror's Note #1, and conducted after the verdict was rendered. Therefore the 
inquiry could not have further tainted the deliberative process. 
The State, however, is correct that the information gained from the post-verdict 
inquiry of Juror #6 does not fall within the three exceptions of I.R.E. 606(b), and is 
therefore inadmissible. This Court, then, will not consider the information obtained 
during the post-verdict inquiry of Juror #6 as evidence in support of, or against, the 
Defendants' Motions. 
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B. The Defendants' Motions for a New Trial are Denied. 
Idaho Criminal Rule 34 provides that a new trial may be "granted in the interests 
of justice." This standard is not an independent reason for a new trial, but must be 
applied when the Court evaluates the statutory grounds for a new trial pursuant to I.C. § 
19-2406. State v. Cantu, 129 Idaho 673, 931 P.2d 1191 (1997). Idaho Code § 19-2406 
provides in pertinent part, that a new trial may only be granted in certain cases. While 
the Defendants do not cite to any particular subsection of I.C. § 19-2406, it appears that 
the Defendants request a new trial pursuant to the following sUbsections: 
3. When the jury has . .. been guilty of any misconduct by which a fair and 
due consideration of the case has been prevented. 
4. When the verdict has been decided by lot or by any means other than a 
fair expression of opinion on the part of all the jurors. 
Neither the rule nor the statute "prohibit the grant of a new trial on grounds not argued 
by the defendant, so long as the defendant has requested a new trial and the ground 
the court relies on is one of those specified in the statute." State v. Mack, 132 Idaho 
480, 974 P .2d 119 (Ct. App. 1999). The question of whether the "interests of justice" 
requires a new trial is directed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Estes v. State, 
111 Idaho 430,725 P.2d 135 (1986). 
1. The Defendants Have Not Shown by Clear and Convincing Evidence 
that the Presiding Juror Engaged in Misconduct Thereby Preventing 
Fair and Due Consideration of the Case. 
The due process clauses of the state and federal constitutions guarantee an 
accused a trial by a fair and impartial jury. State v. Lee, 131 Idaho 600,605, 961 P.2d 
1203,1208 (Ct. App. 1998), citing State v. Clay, 112 Idaho 261, 263, 731 P.2d 804, 
806. "Jury verdicts occupy an exalted place in our criminal justice system." Clay, 112 
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Idaho at 263, 731 P.2d at 806. However, this vast deference "can be justified only if the 
integrity of the jury deliberation process is scrupulously maintained." 1.9.:. 
"Whether a defendant is entitled to a new trial due to juror misconduct is two fold. 
First, the defendant must present clear and convincing evidence that juror misconduct 
has occurred. Second the trial court must be convinced that the misconduct reasonably 
could have prejudiced the defendant." State v. Seiber, 117 Idaho 637,640,791 P.2d 18, 
21 (1990). The trial court must be convinced that the defendant has been denied an 
impartial trial. State v. Marren, 17 Idaho 766,794-795,107 P. 993, 1003 (1910). 
There is no case law or statute that establishes the role of a presiding juror, but 
instead a court must instruct the presiding juror as to their limited role in comparison to 
the other jurors. This Court instructed the Presiding Juror and jury as per Idaho 
Standard Jury Instruction No. 42 which provides that the presiding juror's duty is to "see 
that discussion is orderly; that the issues submitted for your decision are fully and fairly 
discussed; and that every juror has a chance to express himself or herself upon each 
question." (Emphasis added.) 
The Defendants argue that the Presiding Juror engaged in misconduct when she 
halted deliberations because Juror #6 expressed an opinion and provided anecdotal 
information based on his life experience. (Defendants' Motions, p.2.) According to the 
Defendants, the Presiding Juror's 
action completely exceeds the authority granted a presiding juror. It was 
designed to intimidate other jurors and taint the deliberation process ... 
During that period the presiding juror interrupted another juror, and then 
attempted to influence that juror through the use of guilt, recrimination, 
harassment, and the false display of authority. 
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(Defendants' Motions, p.2.) The State asserts generally that there is an insufficient 
factual basis for the Defendants' Motions. (Id.) This Court agrees with the Defendants 
that the issue presented does not concern any improper behavior or bias on the part of 
Juror #6, but concerns the Presiding Juror's decision to halt deliberations. It is to the 
actions of the Presiding Juror that this Court turns its attention. 
The parties have not presented this Court with any case law or other authority 
that addresses a situation where a presiding juror stops deliberations because another 
juror expresses an opinion or offers anecdotal statements about a personal experience. 
In fact, case law shows that deliberations continue through much more contentious 
situations, such as when a juror expresses an unpopular opinion or takes a position 
contrary to the majority of jurors. It appears, then, that the Presiding Juror's decision to 
stop deliberations in response to Juror #6's statements was rather unusual. 
Regardless, the Presiding Juror's unusual action is not "clear and convincing" 
. evidence of misconduct. The only admissible evidence this Court may consider (the 
exchange between the Presiding Juror and this Court) shows that, while the Presiding 
Juror's overreaction may be a cause for concern, the source of the Presiding Juror's 
uneasiness could have stemmed from whether Juror #6 complied with the voir dire 
process, just as well as from the substance of Juror #6's comments. As a result, this 
Court is not convinced that the Presiding Juror's action clearly amounted to misconduct. 
Because the evidence presented does not meet the "clear and convincing" standard for 
juror misconduct, this Court need not evaluate whether the Defendants suffered any 
resulting prejudice. The Defendants' Motions are therefore denied. 
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., .... The Defendants Have Not Shown that the Verdict was Decided by 
Any Means Other than a Fair Expression of Opinion on the Part of all 
the Jurors. 
"Heated debate is expected of jurors." People v. Keenan, 46 Cal.3d 478, 541, 
250 Cal.Rptr. 550, 758 P.2d 1081. But, if jury deliberations are tainted by undue 
pressure, the constitutional guarantee is violated. State v. Timmons, 141 Idaho 376, 
377,109 P.3d 1118, 1119(Ct. App. 2005), citing Lee, 131 Idaho at 605,961 P.2d at 
1208. Trial courts take care to instruct jurors as to their role and the necessity of a full 
and fair deliberative process. For example, Idaho Standard Jury Instruction No. 42 
states: 
As a juror you have a duty to consult with one another and to deliberate 
before making your individual decisions. You may fully and fairly discuss 
among yourselves all of the evidence you have seen and heard in this 
courtroom about this case, together with the law that relates to this case 
as contained in these instructions. 
Consult with one another. Consider each other's views, and deliberate 
with the objective of reaching an agreement, if you can do so without 
disturbing your individual judgment. Each of you must decide this case for 
yourself; but you should do so only after a discussion and consideration of 
the case with your fellow jurors. 
However, none of you should surrender your honest opinion as to the 
weight or effect of evidence or as to the innocence or guilt of the 
defendant because the majority of the jury feels otherwise or for the 
purpose of returning a unanimous verdict. 
(Emphasis added.) Importantly, Idaho Standard Jury Instruction No.2 states in part: 
There is no magical formula by which one may evaluate testimony. You 
bring with you to this courtroom all of the experience and background of 
your lives. In your everyday affairs you determine for yourselves whom 
you believe, what you believe, and how much weight you attach to what 
you are told. The same considerations that you use in your everyday 
dealings in making thee decisions are the considerations which you 
should apply in your deliberations. 
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The State asserts that the verdict is valid because the jurors applied the law to 
the facts of the case and the Defendants have failed to show otherwise. (State's Brief, 
pp.4-5.) The Defendants, however, argue pursuant to I.C. § 19-2406(4) that the verdict 
is "invalid" because the jurors reached a verdict by compromise as a result of the 
"pressure and intimidation applied by the presiding juror." (Id.) 
This Court is invited to infer that the other jurors were not able to express an 
opinion regarding the Defendants' guilt or innocence due to the actions of the Presiding 
Juror. As discussed above, this Court may only consider the limited evidence before it, 
and the exchange between this Court and the Presiding Juror contains no information 
regarding whether the other jurors were intimidated or pressured into compromising 
their opinion regarding the Defendants guilt or innocence. The Presiding Juror did not 
state that she took any further action besides halting deliberations. This Court, 
therefore, declines to infer that the Presiding Juror's decision to halt deliberations 
created such an intimidating atmosphere that the other jurors were not able fully and 
fairly discuss the evidence or complete deliberations without compromising their 
opinions. The Defendants' Motions, are therefore, denied. 
II. CONCLUSION 
The Defendants' Motions for a New Trial are DENIED. 
6~ 
DATED this '3 ' day of January, 2011. 
!:J-t-?~~~ 
John Patrick Luster 
District Judge 
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1. Comply with the Supreme Court Guidelines ; 
2. One still camera (required to pool); 
3. One TV camera (required to pool); 
4. No' zoom lenses or telephotos (no close-ups of any individuals); 
5. Photos taken only during calling of tne case (which concludes when the 
attorneys have advised the Court that they are ready to proceed); 
6. No motor drives, no flashes; 
7. Pool camera authorized by "first come, first served ll request. 
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cc: Counsel of Record 
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Mc;dia to be used: I still oamera; __ video camera; ____ audio equipment 
I certify that I have read the Idaho Supreme Court Order that authorizes cameras in 
the courtroom. I further certify that as a representativ t of the below listed news 
agency, I am aut/torized to bind my news agency and all n embers of its news team. I 
and they agree to comply in all respects with the SuprefTl e Court's Orde.r and rules, 
with any special conditions stated by the trial judge and Jj ith any pool coverage plan 
approved by the trial judge. 
Dated: "3 - 2. 8 - 2. 0 II News Agency: 
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I. Comply with the Supreme Court Guidelines 
2. No photos of children or jurors. 
,3. 
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Description CR 2009-22548 Tankovich, Frank James 20110328 Sentencing 
CR 2009-22648 Tankovich, William M Jr 20110328 Sentencing 
Judge John Patrick Luster 
Clerk Kathy Booth 
Court Reporter Anne MacManus 
PA Art VerHaren 
DA Jed Whitaker - for defendant Frank Tankovich /~7J 




03:04:50 PM DA 
Whitaker 
03:04:56 PM DA 
Schwartz 
03:05:01 PM PA 
Whitaker 
03:05:10 PM DA 
Schwartz 
03:05:21 PM J 
Note 





No changes to PSI 
No changes to PSI - submi~s letter 
Letters received from co-workers and Ira Tankovich - provides 
letter to counsel for review. 
o additional evidence 
03:07:59 PM DA No additional evidence 
Whitaker 




03:12:19 PM J 
I was surprised when I reviewed the PSI as they had different 
recommendations. After thinking about it for a while it settled on 
me that perhaps it is the right course for the court to take - you 
can see the differences in the direction they have taken in their 
lives. Re: criminal history of Frank Tankovich - he presents as a 
person who has been in trouble quite a bit. William served his 
felony on the criminal charge and other than a DUI he's had 
nothing sense. 
If you (Frank) interrupt the court one more time I'll find you in 
contempt of court. You will get a chance to speak. 
03:12:52 PM I promise you I won't say another word. William through out his life 
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has been employed and has not had substance abuse problems 
as has his brother Frank who used heroin through IV. I'll not 
Frank belabor what happened here. It would seem that the department 
should follow the departments recommendation FRANK - prison 5 
years both counts 2 fixed - concurrent. WILLIAM - SUPERVISED 
PROBATION. I ASK FOR LOCAL JAIL OF 120 DAYS 
03:15:46 PM Frank is frustrated and I share some of his frustration. This whole 
thing started because Frank had a gun pulled on him and his 
family. There was yelling but Frank didn't direct anything toward 
Requena. The officer was standing right there and testified to that. 
At the third trial there was a conviction. Frank's done about 6 
months in jail and has essentially been on probation for 2 years 
since this thing has been going on. The person with the gun was 
convicted of conspiracy to disturb the peace. Frank's criminal 
DA history is not that big and most in the 80's or 90's. He came to 
Whitaker Idaho to get away from his past and trouble. He just wants to 
leave people along and to be left alone. I don't think society needs 
protection from him - he's coming in here today and is frustrated. I 
know what he's like - 'we sat down with them and the family and I 
know who he is. He had a rough childhood, harder than most. He 
lost his job over this and he feels that he's lost everything and he's 
frustrated by the system. The facts and circumstances of this case 
when they had a gun pulled on them is unconscionable. I.ask for 
credit for time served 6 mos probation and a withheld judgment. 
03:19:58 PM I'm very frustrated. We were wrongly accused. I was here, I was 
clean, I was kicking heroin. We were out drinking beer and had a. 
good time. We stopped at the stop sign and when my brother saw 
Requena he said hey, come here. And Requena pointed a gun at 
my brother and said "I'm an expert and you know what I'll do." I 
was looking down the barrel of a gun. We went home. He's 
paranoid because he's on the witness protection program for 
smuggling drugs and drugs. What's closer the garage door opener 
or the gun? He's a felon from New York, a gangster, Mafia. It was 
the Tankovich's only. Bill just asked me to back up, 20' , to ask the 
guy for cable. So we backed up and I'm the one who said we 
Frank 
needed to call the cops. We never once stood on his property. We 
just stopped to ask for cable. Bill just asked me to stop and back 
up, that's all. None of us have anything to do with race, we don't' 
support any groups, less than 1 minute after we pulled up he had 
his gun out - it had nothing to do with race. The PA was allowed to 
do everything he could to make it about hate. I know you know it 
had nothing to do with hate. He's not supposed to have a gun 
because he's a convicted felon but nothing has been done to him. 
He had no business having a weapon. What's going on with the 
judicial system? Officers a re paid to serve and protect and have 
guidelines when to pull deadly force, was that reason for him 
(Requena) to pull deadly force. Within one minute he had a gun 
pulled and cocked - less than one minute - is that valid reason. I'm I 
so frustrated. The rape thing - I took a deal because my Dad was 
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dying. That's the only reason it's on my record. With the PA not 
charging (Requena) with possession with intent to use deadly 
force - I told him we'd be back with the cops but the only thing he 
said is that I said "we'll be back" not back with the cops. The PA 
has constantly acted like he's running the courtroom, not you. I am 
the victim, he's the victim (William), Tiffany, Connie and William 
are the victims. Hw them." We didn't know how he felt - we knew 
how we felt. We thought we were doing the right thing. We were 
turned from the victim to whatever it's called - the perpetrator. If I'd 
have done this I'd have said just give me my time. Whatever you 
decide today, my brother has a family. I'd like to have you give me 
my brothers time and let him continue to support his family. Me, 
I'm a loser in life, everything bad has been dealt to me. Let him go 
and I'll do both our sentences together. 
Comments - This is the most emotionally charged case I've ever 
dealt with. PA agrees with the PSI that the appropriate sentence 
for Bill is probation. This case has been going on for 2 years now 
and he's basically been on probation for the two years - he's been 
very upset but has been able to maintain. Both of the Requenas 
have been found guilty of crimes relating to the Tankovich's since 
this began. The state is obviously on Requena's side so they don't 
charge him. Ms. Requena was charged with a felony for pulling 
the same gun on her husband when they argued about this case. 
PA asks for 120 days jail and for what? They simply want to 
punish him .. He'll lose his house, job and the community will be a 
lot worse off if you sent him to jail. 
I moved here to do the best that I can, I have a beautiful wife and 
kids. I leave it in your hands. 
o legal reason to not proceed to judgment 
GUILTY ON VERDICTS This has been one of the more difficult 
cases for me to deal with in my 25 years as a judge. I've always 
had some serious reservations if this case is about race or racial 
harassment. These words would have had to have been said with 
the intent to harass due to his race. It is my belief that the 
comments were spewed over the upset at having a gun pulled on 
them. The 2nd jury disagreed - this is not a difficult charge to 
prove - it is broad under the definition. We're not here to decide 
what to do with Mr. Requena - I would not have come to the same 
conclusion if this case was tried in front of me. I don't know why 
you got out of your vehicle, it might have been to bother Requena 
but the fact is that there was no racial discussion just Requena 
pulling the firearm. The 3 of you individuals are pretty stout built 
and short haircuts. When you re turned you were angry and in 
front of police officers repeatedly called defendant a beaner. 
That's why you are here. I have respect for the jury verdict but I 
also have to remember why we're here. Ira was acquitted of 71 
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conspiracy charge. I don't think the state's theory that Ira was 
going to shoot him while you diverted his attention holds water. Ira 
was sentenced on the charge of felon in possession of firearm. I 
thought the city police did a good job and made a good decision in 
how they handled the matter. I don't feel comfortable to send you' 
to prison for this behavior. Probation is appropriate 5 years 
WILLIAM 2 YEARS FIXED FRANK 4 YEARS FIXED 2 YEARS 
PROBATION If you don't comply with the rules I won't hesitate to 
send you to prison. CONTACT P&P TOMORROW 
SUPERVISION LEVEL PER PO NO ALCOHOL OR BARS 
TESTS/SEARCHES/EVALffX PER PO WORK NO 
INAPPROPRIATE PERSONS 1 YEAR COMPLETE 300 HOURS 
COMMUNITY SERVICE WITH SPECIAL RECOMMENDATION 
THAT SOME BE DONE THROUGH HUMAN RIGHTS 
ASSOCIATION REIMBURSE $500 FOR COST OF PUBLIC 
DEFENDER AND $500 FINE WITH COSTS $125.50 PAY 
WITHIN 18 MONTHS 90 DAYS UNSCHEDULED 
If on probation you can't have contact with anyone on probation -
can I have contact with William? 
I don't know - If that needs to be addressed I can do that at a later 
date 
itions of probation 







IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI g 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) /'\9~J~ 
) Case No.. CRF_U=-~-"'~"""",-"""~~:::::004--=-~ / 
Plaintiff, 







ORDER TO REPORT TO 
PROBATION 
In Custcdy M Yes 
J'" No. 
o RETAINED JURISDICTION 
~SENTENCING 
o PROBATION VIOLATION 
IT IS ORDERED that yo.u physically repcrt to. Probatio.n and Parole no. later than the next business day 
after the date o.f this crder, cr if currently incarcerated, the next business day after yo.ur release. 
Probation & Parole 
202 Anton 
Coeur d' Alene, Idaho 83814 
(208) 769-1444 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that yo.ur co.ntinued release is ccnditio.ned upcn yo.ur making and keeping all 
appointments w~h Probation t-rro1e an~ com~l~t9 w~h aIiJond~ions. 
DATEDthis4-Q-dayof ~ l.&;dL ,204. 
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Judge 
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This matter came on for sentencing March 28, 2011, before the Honorable Judge 
John Patrick Luster. Present were the defendant appearing with his counsel, Jed 
Whitaker, and Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, Art VerHaren. 
WHEREUPON, the Court reviewed the presentence report and the Court having 
ascertained that you have had an opportunity to read the presentence report and review it 
with your lawyer, and you having been given the opportunity to explain, correct or deny 
parts of the presentence report, and having done so, and you having been given the 
opportunity to make a statement and having done so, and recommendations having been 
made by counsel for the State, by your lawyer and by yourself, and there being no legal 
reason given why judgment and sentence should not then be pronounced, the Court did 
then pronounce its judgment and sentence as follows 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND IT IS THE JUDGMENT OF THIS 
COURT that you, FRANK JAMES TANKOVICH. having been advised of and having 
exercised your constitutional rights to a) trial by jury; b) remain silent; and c) confront 
witnesses, and thereafter having been found guilty following trial by jury of the criminal 
charge(s) stated in the Third Amended Indictment on file herein as follows: 
COUNT I, MALICIOUS HARASSMENT, a felony, I.C. 18-7902, 18-204 and 
COUNT II, CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT MALICIOUS HARASSMENT, a 
Felony, I.C.18-7902, 18-1701. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that you shall 
be sentenced pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-2513 to the custody of the Idaho State Board 
of Corrections, to be held and incarcerated by said Board in a suitable place as follows: 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that on the charge of COUNT I, MALICIOUS 
HARASSMENT, I.e. 18-7902, 18-204, you are remanded to the custody of the Idaho 
State Board of Corrections for a period of five (5) years with four (4) 
years fixed and one (1) year indeterminate. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that on the charge of CONSPIRACY TO 
COMMIT MALICIOUS HARASSMENT, I.C. 18-7902, 18-1701, you are remanded 
to the custody of the Idaho State Board of Corrections for a period of five (5) 
years with four (4) year fixed and one (1 ) year 
indeterminate. 
Judgment, sentence and conditions of probation on Counts I and II are concurrent. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that execution of the above sentence be 
suspended and you, FRANK JAMES TANKOVICH., are placed on supervised 
probation for two (2) years upon the terms and conditions set forth below. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that you, FRANK JAMES TANKOVICH 
comply with each of the following TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF PROBATION: 
1. That you shall be place on a level of supervision to be deemed appropriate by 
the Department of Corrections and further that you follow all rules and regulations as 
directed by your probation officer and further that you sign a Probation Agreement 
2. That you shall not commit any criminal offenses. 
3. That you shall submit to searches of your person, personal property, 
automobiles, and residence without a search warrant at the request or direction of your 
ORDER SUSPENDING EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT #2 
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probation officer of police officer. 
4. That you shall submit to a test of your blood, breath or urine to analysis and at 
your own expense at the request or direction of your probation officer. This includes an 
independent request by law enforcement with legal cause to request such testing. 
5. That you shall make every effort to obtain and maintain full-time employment 
or be enrolled in a full-time educational program as your health conditions allow. 
6. That you shall pay fines, court costs and/or reimbursement as follows: 
a. Court fine, costs and surcharge 
b. Community service sign up fee 
c. Community service insurance fee 







All of the above sums are to be paid to the Kootenai County Clerk, 324 W. 
Garden, P.O. Box 9000, Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-9000 in the form of cash, certified 
check or money order. All fees shall be paid within eighteen (18) months. 
7. That you attend and complete any treatment programs as directed by the 
Probation Department including but not limited to tre;;ttment for substance abuse, mental 
health issues, cognitive self-change, vocational rehabilitation or sexual offender 
programming. You shall submit to any evaluations for such treatment as directed by the 
Probation Department. 
8. That you not enter into establishments wherein the primary source of income is 
derived through the dispensing of alcoholic beverages during the period of your 
probation. Further that you not consume or possess any alcoholic beverages during the 
period of your probation. 
9. You are precluded from taking any substances that may alter the results of any 
testing. 
10. That you not associate with anyone deemed inappropriate by your probation 
officer. The Court recommends that the probation department allow continued contact 
between Frank Tankovich and William Tankovich. 
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11. That you sign a waiver of extradition and further that you not resist any 
attempts to return you to the State of Idaho. 
12. That (90) days jail are unscheduled and may be served at the request of your 
probation officer and written approval of the court. 
13. That you shall complete three hundred (300) hours community service within 
eighteen (18) months. The Court recommends that community service coordinator 
attempt to arrange a portion of that service through the Human Rights Center. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this court shall retain your case for any 
probation violation issues. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that your bond be and hereby is exonerated. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that so long as you, FRANK JAMES 
TANKOVICH, abide by and perform all of the foregoing conditions, execution of the 
original judgment and sentence will continue to be suspended. If you violate any of the 
terms and conditions of your probation, you will be brought before the Court for 
execution of the balance of your sentence. 
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL 
YOU, FRANK JAMES TANKOVICH, ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that you 
have a right to appeal this to the Idaho Supreme Court. Any notice of appeal must be 
filed within forty-two (42) days of the entry of the written order in this matter 
YOU ARE FURTHER NOTIFIED that if you are unable to pay the costs of an 
appeal, you have the right to apply for leave to appeal in forma pauperis or to apply for 
the appointment of counsel at public expense. If you have any questions concerning your 
right to appeal, you should ~<;:ult your present lawyer. 
ENTERED thi~ day of maY'c.J, ,2011. 
John Patrick Luster, District Judge 
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CERTIFI~ Md'ING/SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the~ day of 'rJt 20LL-, copies of the foregoing Judgment and 
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- ,Deputy P A for Kootenai County 
~ - . , Defense Attorney 
Defendant, c/o KCSO 
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R .f"FA-'XS.D -~ Probation & Pole '1 (pc;' - / J./'D J Ceo J () I\:) -VU 
ON q/18/11 -J.- Kootenai Cou Sheriffs Department ffd ... ) '1' o;z. 
#- __ Idaho Dept of ransportation (fax 208-334-8739) 
Information stems Department, Idaho Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, 2, 451 
State Street oise ID 83720 {!()lly:SY~ £It; ~ ... Ij 9 3 
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CASE NUMBER CR-09-0022S48 
MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF 
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
IN DIRECT APPEAL; RETAINING TRIAL 
COUNSEL FOR RESIDUAL PURPOSES 
COMES NOW, the above named defendant, by and through his attorney, ledediah 1 
Whitaker, Deputy Public Defender and hereby moves the Court for an Order pursuant to Idaho Code 
§ 19-867, et seq., and Rule l3(b), (12) and (19) for its order appointing the State Appellate Public 
Defender's Office to represent the Appellant in all further proceedings. This motion is brought on 
the grounds and for the reasons that the Defendant is currently being represented by the Office of the 
Public Defender, Kootenai County; the State Appellate Public Defender is authorized by statute to 
represent the Defendant in all felony appellate proceedings; and it is in the interest of justice, for 
them to do so in this case since the Defendant is indigent, and any further proceedings on this case 
will be appealed. 
MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER IN 
DIRECT APPEAL; RETAINING TRIAL COUNSEL FOR RESIDUAL PURPOSES -1-
720 
DATED this 17 day of May, 2011. 
THE LAW OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC 
DEFENDER OF KOOTENAI COUNTY 
BY: JE1Z~J W:;AKER 
DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF STATE APPELATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
IN' DIRECT APPEAL; RETAINING TRIAL COUNSEL FOR RESIDUAL PURPOSES -2-
72" 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this \ 7 day of May, 2011, served a true and correct 
copy of the attached MOTION FOR APPOiNtMENT OF STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC 
DEFENDER via interoffice mail or as otherwise indicated upon the parties as follows: 
x 
x 
Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney 
P.O. Box 9000 
Coeur d' Alene, Idaho 83816-9000 
State Appellate Public Defender 
3647 Lake Harbor Lane 
Boise, Idaho 83703 
Lawrence G. Wasden 
Attorney General 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 







First Class Mail 
Certified Mail 
Facsimile (208) 334-2985 
First Class Mail 
Certified Mail 
Facsimile (208) 854-8071 
Reporter for District Judge John T. Mitchell, Julie Foland via Interoffice Mail 
Reporter for District Judge Fred M. Gibler, Byrl R. Cinnamon via Interoffice Mail 
:A Reporter for District Judge John P. Luster, Anne MacMannus via Interoffice Mail 
Reporter for District Judge Benjamin Simpson, JoAnn Schaller via Interoffice Mail 
Reporter for District Judge Lansing Haynes, Laurie Johnson via Interoffice Mail 
MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF STATE APPELATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 




501 Government Way/Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-9000 
,Telephone: (208) 446-1800 
Facsimile: (208) 446-1833 
STATE OF IDAHO } 
COUNTY OF KOOTENAI SS 
RLED: J q lp 
2011 MAY 19 AM 10: 08 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 






FRANK J. TANKOVICH, ) 
WILLIAM M. TANKOVICH, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
Case No. CR-F09-22548IF09-22648 
MOTION TO RELEASE 
PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBITS 
COMES NOW, ARTHUR VERHAREN, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Kootenai County 
Idaho, and hereby moves the above entitled Court for an order releasing to Kimberly Requena the 
Plaintiffs exhibit(s), a.45 caliber hand gun, belonging to Kimberly Requena. This request is made 
for the reason said person requests the release. 
DATED this /1 day of ,All If1 
MOTION TO RELEASE PLAINTIFF'S 
EXHIBITS: Page 1 
,2011. 
BARRY McHUGH 
Prosecuting Attorney for 
Kootenai County, Idaho 
~~~ 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
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Prosecutor's Certificate of Transmittal 
I hereby certifY that on the /7 
the foregoing was caused to be mailed: 
PUBLIC DEFENDERS OFFICE, FAXED 
CHRISTOPHER, SCHWARTZ, FAXED 
MOTION TO RELEASE PLAINTIFF'S 
EXBIBITS: Page 2 
dayof /Vl # , 2011, a true and correct copy of 
724 
010'6; It.,~ "l· : '!n~·, dt~Vln \, 
ledediah 1. Whitaker, Deputy Public Defender 
Office of the Kootenai County Public Defender 
PO Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701 
Bar Number: 6084 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 














ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF STATE 
APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER IN 
DIRECT APPEAL; RETAINING TRIAL 
COUNSEL FOR RESIDUAL PURPOSES 
Defendant. 
TO: OFFICE OF THE IDAHO STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER, AND, 
JEDEDIAH J WHITAKER, DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER, KOOTENAI COUNTY. 
A judgment having been entered by this Court on March 31, 2011, and the defendant having 
requested the aid of counsel in pursuing a direct appeal from this district court in this felony matter, 
and defendant's trial counsel having filed a timely notice of appeal, and the Court being satisfied 
that said defendant continues to be a needy person entitled to public representation, therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, in accordance with I.e. 19-870, that the State Appellate Public 
Defender is appointed to represent defendant in all further proceedings involving his appeal. 
ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER IN 
DIRECT APPEAL; RETAINING TRIAL COUNSEL FOR RESIDUAL PURPOSES -1-
725 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that trial counsel shall remain as appointed counsel of record 
for all other matters involving action in the trial court which, if resulting in an order in defendant's 
favor, could affect the judgment, order or sentencing in the action, until the expiration of the time 
limit for filing said motions or, if sought and denied, upon the expiration of the time for appeal of 
such ruling with the responsibility to decide whether or not a further appeal will be taken in such 
matters. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that trial counsel shall cooperate with the Office of State 
Appellate Public Defender in the prosecution of defendant's appeal. 
DATED this 
~ 
\ '\ day of May, 2011. 
JOHN P. LUSTER 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF STATE APPELATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
IN DIRECT APPEAL; RETAINING TRIAL COUNSEL FOR RESIDUAL PURPOSES -2-
726 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1 HEREBY CERTIFY that 1 have thidOday of, served a of May, 2011 true and 
correct copy of the attached ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC 
DEFENDER via facsimile, interoffice mail or as otherwise indicated upon the parties as follows: 
X Kootenai County Public Defender [ ] Interoffice Mail 
~ Facsimile (208) 446-1701 
X Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney [ ] Interoffice Mail 
~ Facsimile (208) 446-1833 
X State Appellate Public Defender [ ] First Class Mail 
364 7 Lake Harbor Lane [ ] Certified Mail 
Boise, Idaho 83703 »GJ Facsimile (208) 334-2985 




P.O. Box 83720 Facsimile (208) 854-8071 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
Supreme Court (certified) [ ] First Class Mail 
y Fax Certified (208) 334-2616 
Reporter for District Judge John T. Mitchell, Julie Foland via Interoffice Mail 
Reporter for District Judge Fred M. Gibler, Byrl R. Cinnamo~= 'fJil 
~ Reporter for District Judge John P. Luster, Anne MacMannu . via Interoffice Mail ----
Reporter for District Judge Charles W. Hosack, JoAnn Schaller via Interoffice Mail 
Reporter for District Judge Lansing Haynes, Laurie Johnson v' Interoffice Mail 
ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF STATE APPELATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
IN DIRECT APPEAL; RETAINING TRIAL COUNSEL FOR RESIDUAL PURPOSES -3-
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IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DIST 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 






FRANK J. T ANKOVICH, ) 




Case No. CR-F09-22548IF09-22648 
ORDER TO 
RELEASE EXHIBITS 
The Court having before it the State's motion, and good cause appearing now, therefore; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above entitled Plaintiffs Exhibit(s), .45 caliber hand 
gun, entered at the jury trial, and the same hereby are, released to Kimberly Requena. 
?-r -. 
ENTERED this ---!... __ day of --J tJ V\ L ' 2011. 
CLERKilCERTIFIC TE OF MAILING 
I hereby certifY that on the ~ day of 2011, that a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing was mailed/delivered by regular U.S Mail. ~stage.J?~aid, Interoffice Mail, Hand 
Delivered, or Faxed ~~ :::? lj 0 ""Ij. 77d.. 
Prosecutor11~ / )'6C2....) Defense Attorney 17'&-llOJDefendant ___ _ 
KCPSB Audit!!? twA Police Agency 
Bonding Co. Other~~ .L1'10 -/?!e,? 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTEAI 
STATE OF IDAHO 
PlaintifflRespondent 
VS. 
















I, Rita J Brown, Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, in and for the County of Kootenai, do hereby certify that the foregoing Record in 
this cause was compiled and bound under my direction and is a true, correct and complete 
Record of the pleadings and documents requested by Appellate Rule 28. 
I further certify that the following will be submitted as exhibits to this Record on Appeal: 
PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT #3 (FILED 11102/09) 
PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT #4 (FILED 11/02/09) 
TRANSCRIPT - MOTION FOR BOND REDUCTION (FILED 12118/09) 
TRANSCRIPT - GRAND JURY SELECTION (FILED 01108/10) 
PRESENTENCE REPORT (FILED 01/04111) 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 
Court this 23rd Day of September, 2011. 
CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT 
Clifford T. Hayes 
by: rLr~b~ 
Depu# Clerk' 
Rita J Brown 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
~~:~::~TEtW}SS 
THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING IS 
A TRUE COpy OF THE ORIGIttAL NOW ON 
FILE OR RECORD IN THIS JFFICE. 
SEALEDONTHISd3~ DAYOF$!C+· ~ I{ 
CLERK ~~TCOURT 
BY  ~peputy 
" 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO 
PlaintifflRespondent 
VS. 















CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Rita J Brown, Deputy Clerk of the District Court ofthe First Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Kootenai, do hereby certify that I have 
personally served or mailed, by United States Mail, one copy of the Clerk's Record to 
each of the attorneys of record in this cause as follows: 
Ms. Molly Huskey 
State Appellate Public Defender 
3647 Lake Harbor Ln 
Boise, ID 83703 
Attorney for Appellant 
Mr. Lawrence Wasden 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
700 W. Jefferson # 210 
Boise ID 83720-0qlO 
Attorney for Respondent 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of 
said Court this~)~7~f/bay of September, 2011 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Clifford T. Hayes 
Clerk of District Court 
.-
By r2J "-
Rita J. Brow ,Deputy Clerk 
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